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In general, neither the social norms nor market dynamics stimulate spontaneously activities 
and practices conducive to biodiversity. The nature of public good of biodiversity leads to its 
rapid erosion. Even if it can respond positively to social expectations and improve welfare in 
the long term
2, taking into account biodiversity often leads to changes in the way we produce 
or  how  to  exercise  its  property  right.  The  consideration  of  biodiversity  may  determine 
production losses and income decreases. The forest owners receive their income solely from 
the wood production, which limits their interest vis-à-vis biodiversity, but more importantly, 
biodiversity being a public good, they are strongly encouraged to leave up to other owners to 
maintain biodiversity on their property, to obtain some benefits without bearing the costs 
(including  opportunity  cost,  linked  to  lower  productivity  of  certain  types  of  forestry).  In 
addition, the length of the production cycle and the difficult integration into the quantitative 
approaches of the concepts of risk and resilience make it difficult, but not impossible, the 
development  of  cost-benefits  analysis  that  would  allow  a  forester  (but  also  the  public 
authority)  to  estimate  the  value  of  maintaining  some  forms  of  biodiversity,  and  their 
opportunity cost. 
Thus, the development of a strategy to stem biodiversity loss requires incentives to change 
behaviour  of  different  actors  (e.g.,  foresters,  landowners,  users  of  nature,  managers  and 
experts). To this end, public policies use various kinds of incentives
3. The instruments the 
most frequently used are taxes and levies (e.g., taxes for wildlife preservation, entrance rights, 
                                                
1  CEMAGREF,  UR  ADBX,  50 avenue  de  Verdun  Gazinet  -  F33612  Cestas  cedex,  France. 
elodie.brahic@cemagref.fr.  The  author  would  like  to  thank  Jean-Philippe  Terreaux  (Cemagref)  for  useful 
comments and suggestions. She also acknowledges the French Ministries of Agriculture and of Ecology for 
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2 Biodiversity has a dual function: first, it plays a functional role in the ecosystem (contribution to ecological 
services and so, participation in the production of goods that have social and economic interests) and, secondly, 
it contributes to adaptive capacity of ecosystems to environmental changes (role of stabilization and resilience). 
3 See for example Boyd and Simpson (1999), Doremus (2003), Patterson and Coelho (2009), Ranganathan et al. 
(2008), Brahic (2010a).   2 
and  levy  taxes  for  the  use  of  natural  resources),  subsidies  (for  reforestation,  agro-
environmental measures ...) or tradable permits (mainly fishing and hunting licenses). In most 
cases, these instruments are applied to the preservation of habitats and ecosystems, only one 
third of the examples involve direct conservation of species (with a clear tendency for the 
protection of fauna rather than flora). The use of financial mechanisms (reduction of taxes in 
green investment funds, venture capital green) or the principle of compensation for preserving 
biodiversity are still poorly developed (as shown in the table 1 below). 
 
Table 1: Distribution of market-based instruments in the database of Bräuer et al. (2006) 
 
Source : Bräuer et al. (2006) 
 
Through an analysis of the international literature, this paper reviews the incentive schemes 
designed to influence actors’ behaviour, especially managers and owners of private forests, in 
order to support biodiversity. The aim is to establish a typology of incentives measures to 
improve the provision of ecological services and to identify novel solutions used abroad that 
could be used in the French private forest sector.  
 
Regulations 
In recent decades, the predominant instrument in the European community to achieve the 
objectives  of  sustainable  use  of  natural  resources  has  been  the  use  of  regulations  from 
environmental laws, based on the principle of Command And Control. They are generally 
used to protect endangered species or natural areas rich in species, by prohibiting their use or 
by  setting  restrictions  on  access  (see  the  IUCN  classification):  for  example,  through  the 
creation  of  national  parks,  natural  reserves,  or the establishment  of  red  list  of  threatened 
species with specific conservation actions.  
Although  the  creation  of  protected  areas  is  the  form  of  regulatory  intervention  most 
commonly  used  to  preserve  forest  biodiversity,  other  regulations  aim  a  sustainable 
management  of  private  forests  through  biodiversity  offsets,  which  are  defined  as 
“conservation  actions  intended  to  compensate  for  the  residual,  unavoidable  harm  to 
biodiversity  caused  by  development  projects,  so  as  to  ensure  no  net  loss  of  biodiversity. 
Before developers contemplate offsets, they should have first sought to avoid and minimise 
harm to biodiversity” (ten Kate et al., 2004). They provide flexibility for agents to realize 
their development project, while respecting biodiversity conservation objectives. This may 
relate to species, habitats or ecosystems. In some countries, regulations require explicitly the 
use of biodiversity offsets, including the following:   3 
- The Wetland Banking (United States) was established under the Clean Water Act (1972) and 
the US Army Corps of Engineers regulations to protect wetlands; 
- The Conservation Banking (United States), established under the Endangered Species Act 
(1973) and the Guidance on Establishment, Use and Operations of Conservation Banks, aims 
to protect species and their habitat; 
- The protection of local vegetation (Australia), established by the Native Vegetation Act 
(1991, 2003), aims to encourage and promote the management of local vegetation and to 
prevent the clearing; 
- In France, the CDC Biodiversity of the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC) aims to 
facilitate  compensation  actions.  It  works  with  businesses,  communities,  builders  and 
government  in  their  actions  (voluntary  or  regulatory)  in  favour  of  biodiversity:  from 
restoration, management and promotion to compensation. 
Note  that  this  biodiversity  offsets  principle  is  closely  linked  to  the  notion  of  strong 
sustainability (Daly, 1998)
4: in the context of a development project, the aim is to ensure that 
there is no net loss of biodiversity, so the natural capital stock must remain constant (or 
increase wherever possible). 
In  the  absence  of  regulatory  requirements,  various  reasons  can  motivate  a  company  to 
voluntarily offset the damage it causes to biodiversity: it can enhance the company reputation; 
induce  a  certain  kindness  of  the  regulator  and  better  relations  with  local  communities, 
environmental groups and other stakeholders, which may contribute to its functioning (e.g. an 
easier access to capital); and giving some freedom in how to comply with regulations vis-à-vis 
biodiversity, biodiversity offsets can help to find the least expensive means. 
 
The advantage of regulations is that they are the most direct way to achieve an environmental 
objective.  The  major  drawback  is  that  they  are  economically  inefficient  and  costly:  the 
government is not able to differentiate the conditions of regulation enforcement by agents so 
it does not allow those who could contribute the most effectively to make the effort. 
Due to budgetary constraints, the choice of measures and strategies is not only based on their 
environmental effectiveness,  but also on their  monetary efficiency. Thus, given that most 
regulatory  mechanisms  are  costly  to  the  public  and  private  sectors
5,  market-based 
instruments
6 are becoming increasingly important because they offer new, less expensive
7, 
perspectives to achieve the biodiversity objectives and can be used to supplement traditional 
regulatory measures. Moreover, particular attention is paid to the payment for environmental 
services. 
 
                                                
4 The strong sustainability approach requires that the stocks of natural capital (ecological assets) should not 
decrease over-time (Pearce et al., 1994). This is mainly because natural capital is associated with ecological 
assets, which are non-substitutable, and very essential for the welfare and survival of human beings. These assets 
are often referred to as “critical natural capital”. 
5 Regulatory mechanisms are costly indirectly for the public sector and directly for the private one. 
6  Market-based  instruments  “seek  to  address  the  market  failure  of  ‘environmental  externalities’  either  by 
incorporating the external cost of production or consumption activities through taxes or charges on processes or 
products, or by creating property rights and facilitating the establishment of a proxy market for the use of 
environmental services” (European Environment Agency). 
7  Market-based  instruments are  more economically  efficient than regulatory  measures  because  they  use  the 
market forces that allow the least costly activities to be completed first.    4 
Payment for Environmental Services 
The existing literature on markets for forest environmental services has often adopted a broad 
definition of market (e.g., Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002) to indicate any transaction where 
financial compensation, or sometimes in kind, is offered to suppliers of an environmental 
service. Therefore we generally speak of “Payments for Environmental Services” (PES).  
 
Why paying for environmental services? 
The various land uses and their characteristics generate a variety of environmental services 
(e.g., high levels of vegetative cover help regulate water flows, thereby reducing flooding risk 
and soil erosion). However, the landowners receive no compensation for such services and in 
fact, ignore them when making decisions about their land use. This failure to take into account 
these environmental services (ES) can lead to suboptimal decisions from a social perspective. 
Indeed, the owner’s benefits resulting from a forest conservation decision are generally lower 
than those from, for example, forest conversion into crop. However, the deforestation required 
for this conversion may impose costs on other agents, including the downstream people who 
no longer receive the benefits of services provided by forests (water filtration...). To ensure 
that conservation is more attractive and that land use is socially optimal, the idea is that the 
beneficiaries of ES pay compensation to landowners  in return for adopting  practices  that 
protect the ecosystem and associated services. 
 
Wunder (2005) defines PES as: voluntary transactions related to well-defined environmental 
services (or possible land-uses to secure these services), including at least one buyer and one 
supplier; the payment being contingent on environmental service provision (conditionality). 
The PES are efficient because they allow agents whose ES supply cost is below the level of 
compensation to contract, and agents whose opportunity cost is higher not to do so, unlike a 
regulatory measure that is not flexible because it requires the same level of ES provision from 
all. Thus, the more ES provision costs will be heterogeneous, the more PES will be effective 
when  compared  to  a  regulatory  approach.  This  being  said,  PES  are  not  always 
environmentally effective: since they are established on a voluntary basis, it is more difficult 
to identify land that has the highest value in terms of biodiversity, in contrast to protected 
areas. 
The success of a PES and ultimately the achievement of the biodiversity targets, depend on 
the project characteristics and the context in which it is established: the link between land uses 
and the provision of ES must be scientifically proved, the ES must be clearly defined, one 
should check whether the land use is consistent with the provision of ES, transaction costs 
should not exceed the potential benefits, payments must be flexible  (to adapt to possible 
changes), continuous and accessible to all potentially interested agents. 
The services of biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration, protection of watersheds and 
scenic beauty are the environmental services considered as having the highest commercial 
potential. Over 300 markets have been identified in these areas (Landell-Mills and Poras, 
2002; Pagiola and Platais, 2002a), most are recent or in their experimental phase. The state 
has  an  active  role  in  such  markets,  as  buyer,  seller  or  intermediary
8.  Providers  and 
                                                
8 According to the study conducted by Landell-Mills and Porras (2002), the state accounts for 16% of buyers, 
23% of sellers and 17% of intermediaries.   5 
beneficiaries are private individuals (owners, forest managers, farmers and domestic users) 
and companies (forestry, hydro-power, tourism, fishing, hunting, companies emitting carbon). 
In this paper, we focus on PES in place to protect biodiversity.  
The  biodiversity  protection  consists  in  protecting  valuable  ecosystems,  natural  habitats, 
species  or  genetic  resources.  These  services  are  often  difficult  to  value  because  of  the 
complexity of biodiversity and scientific uncertainties related to its provision. Furthermore, it 
is not always easy to identify and therefore to quantify the beneficiaries, which involves high 
transaction costs (Grieg-Gran and Bann, 2003). Moreover, ES cannot be traded on a market 
such  as  directly  consumable  forest  products  (e.g.  timber  products)  because  of  their 
characteristics of public good. Therefore, they depend heavily on governmental policies and 
rarely start with spontaneous actions of the private sector, which explains why traditionally 
the market is dominated by the public sector. 
The concept of PES covers a wide range of instruments (Jack et al., 2008) but in this paper, 
we focus on different forms of subsidies and more widely on conservation contracts. 
 
Source: Jack et al. (2008) 
 
1.  Subsidies / Funds 
Subsidies  are  one  of  the  most  commonly  used  instruments
9  (OECD,  2008),  especially  in 
agriculture and forestry
10, and more widely for the preservation of habitats and ecosystems 
(see  Table 1).  There  are  grants  for  maintenance  and  forest  management,  forestry, 
afforestation,  reforestation,  forest  resources...,  in  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Netherlands, 
Czech Republic, United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The European 
Union also funds various programs such as payments for Natura 2000 areas, support for forest 
certification, LIFE +...  
Regarding funds for the environment, they are mainly used to protect a particular species and 
to compensate landowners who are no longer allowed to pursue certain activities on their 
land. For example: 
-  The  Monarch  butterfly  conservation  fund  was  established  in  Mexico  by  the  WWF  to 
preserve  the  Monarch  butterfly  habitat  (Missrie  and  Nelson,  2005).  It  consists  in  paying 
communities located within the biosphere reserve of the Monarch butterfly to preserve forest 
by giving up logging permits and conducting conservation actions. Agreements are signed 
                                                
9 This widespread use results in part from their relative political acceptability compared to other instruments and 
their simplicity of application (Bräuer et al., 2006). 
10  Other  application  fields:  Inland  water,  Marine  and  coast,  Mountain,  Dry  and  sub-humid  land,  Species 
management and others (ecotourism, mining, etc).   6 
between  the  communities  (who  agree  to  transfer  their  logging  permits  and  to  undertake 
conservation actions on their lands), WWF (who pays for permits and conservation actions) 
and government (which is committed to facilitate administrative procedures to make these 
payments). However, this fund is subject to large institutional complexity, requires long-term 
financial commitments and the control is expensive.  
-  In  New  Zealand,  the  Forest  Heritage  Fund  (created  in  1990)  supports  the  voluntary 
establishment of sustainable forestry practices and compensates the woodland private owners 
who have no right to cut trees on some plots (Hutching, 1999).  
- In Australia, the Revolving Fund for Nature (administered by the Victorian Trust for Nature, 
VTN) funds the purchase of lands with high ecological value. After acquisition, the VTN 
writes a legally binding agreement that establishes restrictions and protection activities on the 
lands, and sells them to private owners who are then bound by the Convention (Carter, 1999).  
 
This kind of instruments has the advantage of establishing a direct link between economic 
incentives and environmental outcome. They also perform well when there are specific goals 
(specific area…) and when it is necessary to involve the private sector (foresters...) in the 
provision  of  public  goods.  However,  procedures  for  allocating  the  grants  can  be  quite 
complex, the costs can be substantial, and incentives are only temporary because when the 
payment stops, the agents revert again to their former practices. 
Overall, the biodiversity conservation opportunities are superior to the funding opportunity. 
The competition that characterized the supply, namely between projects to be funded, and 
relatively weak demand, tends to lower the payments allocated to conservation at a level only 
slightly above the opportunity cost. It should therefore focus more on  measures  that will 
strengthen demand in order to stimulate competition and willingness to pay for management 
and conservation of biodiversity.  
 
2.  Conservation contracts / Voluntary agreements 
In many industrialized countries, forests are mainly in the private domain (in France, they 
represent  three  quarters  of  forests).  Forest  preservation  and  biodiversity  protection  are 
problematic in terms of property rights respect (in some cases it can be difficult to compel 
private owners to undertake actions on their land). Thus, land markets are increasingly used to 
acquire easements or concessions for conservation
11 and development rights
12 relating to lands 
that provide natural habitats. This awareness that we may acquire certain use rights rather than 
global rights has largely contributed to biodiversity conservation. For example: 
                                                
11 Conservation easements are contractual agreements by which landowners transfer in perpetuity their land use 
rights on a parcel of land to land trusts, public organization or a Non-governmental organization (NGO) for 
conservation objectives. These easements may prohibit certain land uses (e.g., new buildings or facilities) or only 
allow the intended uses, through financial compensation paid to owners.  
12 Development rights have been established by governments to increase the flexibility of land development 
restrictions in a conservation area. The idea is to make available a certain amount of these tradable rights: owners 
who wish to develop their land more than their initial rights allow them can buy additional rights from those who 
do not wish to develop their land. These rights are mainly used in the United States for the conservation of 
historic buildings, archaeological sites and wetlands, and are increasingly used to promote forest conservation.   7 
-  In  Costa  Rica
13,  since  1997  the  government  has  established  a  program
14  under  which 
payments
15 are made to landowners who restrict their activities to certain land uses (new 
plantations, sustainable forest, conservation of natural lands ...). Funding is provided by the 
government through FONAFIFO (Fondo Nacional de Financiamento Forestal)
16, the World 
Bank (USD 32.6 million of loan) and Global Environment Facility (USD 8 billion of grant). 
In return for these payments, landowners give up their right to FONAFIFO on environmental 
services  for  5 years,  and  manage  or  protect  their  forest  for  20 years  (15 years  for 
reforestation). This program is a success: between 1999 and 2005, the lands under contract 
have  increased,  the  loss  of  72 000 ha  of  forests  in  biodiversity  priority  areas  has  been 
prevented (Tattenbach et al., 2006). 
- In China
17, the Natural Forest Conservation Program is to protect and restore natural forests 
through logging bans and afforestation incentives. It is largely funded by government (mainly 
to cover economic losses caused by changes in timber harvesting and management of forest 
companies) and payments are contingent on actions undertaken. Between 1998 and 2003, 
areas suffering from soil erosion have declined by 6%, the amount of wood harvested from 
primary forests has decreased by 41%, which has reduced carbon emissions, and habitat of 
fauna and flora was improved.  
 
Many governments rely on voluntary programs to acquire land use rights while leaving the 
land  in  private  ownership.  This  voluntary  biodiversity-protection  is  based  on  temporary 
periods of protection and on voluntary participation. Forest owners define the land to protect 
and the amount of compensation they want to receive. The amount of compensation reflects 
the  forester’  objectives,  its  attitude  towards  biodiversity  (…).  If  its  objectives  include 
environmental concerns (such as biodiversity protection), one can expect that the level of 
requested compensation is lower than when goals are only productive (Boyd and Simpson, 
1999). In addition, a small compensation may create a “win-win” situation for both the owner 
(who  receives  income  from  the  forest  protection  and  a  utility  of  forest  biodiversity)  and 
society (via an increasing protection of biodiversity). 
This  protection  induces  a  contracting:  the  owner  signs  a  contract  (with  the  State  or  a 
conservation agency) that commits him to protect all or part of its forest in accordance with 
the wishes he expressed. The contracting facilitates the identification of specific management 
constraints, for a given period: the concept of contract refers to the idea of mutual consent, 
which involves that the definition of outcomes is negotiated and individualized. The aim is to 
make “sustainable” activities as profitable as others, by paying the additional costs and the 
lost profits incurred by those who choose these activities.  
Various arguments advocate for voluntary approaches (Juutinen et al., 2008): because they 
are voluntary, they are widely accepted by society, which can reduce conflict (expensive) 
among  stakeholders  and  promote  positive  attitudes  toward  environmental  protection;  they 
motivate owners to provide biodiversity services (Smith and Shogren, 2002), which reduces 
transaction  costs  compared  with  regulatory  approaches.  Furthermore,  budget  constraints 
encourage the move towards voluntary approaches, particularly to land leases which are less 
expensive than land purchase.  
                                                
13 Costa Rica was a pioneer in the use of PES in developing countries. 
14 This program was created under the Forest Act of 1996. See Pagiola (2008), Rojas and Aylward (2003), 
Chomitz et al. (1999), Castro et al. (2000), Wunder and Wertz-Kanounnikoff (2009). 
15 The amount of payment varies depending on land use. 
16 3.5% income tax on sales of fossil fuels is used for the PES, which represents about USD 10 million per year. 
17 See Liu et al. (2008)   8 
Some  examples  of  voluntary  biodiversity-protection  are  presented  here
18,  all  of  these 
programs having a biodiversity conservation objective through an increase or maintenance of 
the overall proportion of forest or specific forest communities: 
 
-  In  Finland,  voluntary  protection  of  non-industrial  private  forest  owners  was  recently 
introduced and tested in various pilot areas: 
The Natural Values Trading
19 is an agreement concludes between a landowner and the State 
in which the owner agrees to produce biodiversity services on his land. This agreement may 
define specific areas in which the owner must maintain rare species or essential elements for 
biodiversity  (e.g.,  dead  trees).  The  owner’s  proposal  is  assessed  through  the  proposed 
conservation objectives. It includes the economic values of ecological characteristics (e.g. 
dead wood, endangered species, distance to natural areas of protection, area size, landscape 
values...)  and  the  costs  of  delayed  harvest.  This  valuation  allows  comparing  different 
proposals. The State leases the land temporarily to the owner (the agreement has a limited 
duration of 10 years) and the annual compensation is between 20 €/ha and 300 €/ha. 
The Central Karelia Herb-rich Forests Network
20 aims to preserve biodiversity  values of 
invaluable herb-rich forests through a network of protected forests that improve connectivity 
between protected areas. A “Forest Star” model is used to value the ecological quality of the 
proposal. In this model, experts attribute weights to three criteria (the main type of forest and 
endangered species, spatial characteristics, and complementary characteristics) according to 
their priority (Pykälaäinen et al., 2005). Forests are then classified according to their value in 
terms of biodiversity and the cost of protection (i.e. the compensation requested by the owner) 
to achieve the best cost-benefit  ratio.  During the three-year pilot project (2004-2006),  87 
owners  have  shown  their  interest  in  this  project,  72  owners  have  met  the  environmental 
criteria and finally, 11 permanent contracts and 25 temporary contracts were concluded. The 
average compensation is 142 €/ha/year.  
 
- In Austria, since 1995, the Natural Forest Reserves Programme
21 aims to develop a forest 
reserves  network  to  maintain  biodiversity  and  the  particular  characteristics  of  different 
ecological communities. It is interested only in protected reserves, forests that depend on 
specific forestry treatments are excluded from this program. The goal is to include at least one 
representation of each forest type within each of the 22 biogeographical areas in Austria. 
Since  the  beginning  of  the  program,  850  sites  have  been  proposed,  450  sites  have  been 
examined in detail, and 180 sites (8272 ha) have been approved and committed to a contract.  
 
- In Sweden, the Nature Conservation Agreements are contracts between a private landowner 
and the forestry agency in order to maintain or restore forest habitats. Professional foresters 
propose candidates for protection (propositions are based on the identification of habitats of 
high  ecological  quality),  and  the  owners  decide  to  contract  or  not.  The  amount  of 
compensation is specific to each case but does not cover the actual costs of lost economic 
value after the contract. The contracts are established for a maximum period of 50 years. The 
first agreements were signed in 1994. In 2004, 2 240 sites were involved (i.e., 24 570 ha).  
                                                
18 See Brahic (2010b) 
19 See Mayer and Tikka (2006), Juutinen et al. (2008), Kurttila et al. (2008). 
20 See Kurttila et al. (2008). 
21 See Frank and Müller (2003), Mayer and Tikka (2006).   9 
- In Vermont (United States), the Use Value Appraisal Program is intended for: slow or 
prevent the conversion of forest areas in private residential or commercial areas, maintain 
canopy cover, improve private forest management practices, encourage landowners to harvest 
crops with high economic value and support the economic sector of forestry. To be part of the 
program, forests must have a forest management plan approved by the State. Owners who 
commit pay taxes on the use value (around USD 450/ha) and not on the market value that 
could reach USD 40,000/ha on lands with high probability of development (for residential or 
commercial).  
 
Within the Natura 2000 European network
22, France has opted for a voluntary and contractual 
sites management, offering users the possibility to get involved in the management through 
Natura 2000 management contracts and the Charter of Natura 2000. 
- The Natura 2000 management contracts include a set of commitments to conservation and, 
when appropriate, restoration of natural habitats and species that justified the Natura 2000 
creation. They define the type and modalities of public subsidies and services provided in 
exchange  by  the  beneficiary.  Eligible  operations  in  forest  environments  are  classical 
operations of marking and cutting wood or clearing made for the purpose of protecting the 
natural environment and without production issues. 
In  a  town  located  in  the  Natura 2000  site  of  “Lison  Valley”
23,  the  establishment  of  a 
Natura 2000 contract allowed to reconcile forestry and natural habitats preservation. Indeed, 
the additional operating costs related to the “yarder cable” extraction technique
24, which is a 
more expensive technique than conventional methods (that use tractors and hauling) while 
respecting the sensitive aquatic environments in place, was fully funded by the State and the 
European Union through a Natura 2000 contract (total amount of 6 518.70 €). 
- The Natura 2000 Charter involves commitments of sustainable management and returns to 
sports  or  leisure  practices  respectful  of  natural  habitats  and  species.  It  does  not  involve 
payment  of  financial  compensation  but  it  entitles  to  exemption  from  property  tax  on 
undeveloped land (taxe foncière sur les propriétés non bâties) and provides access to some 
public funding (especially in forestry where being a Natura 2000 membership is a guarantee 
of sustainable management of woods and forests). The participant agrees for a period of 5 or 
10 years. 
 
- In France, la loi d’orientation sur la forêt (2001) affirmed the importance of developing 
contractual approaches in providing des Chartes forestières de territoire
25 (CFT). Established 
for a fixed duration, the CFT cover a territory identified as relevant vis-à-vis one (or more) 
problem(s)  following  the  logic:  a  problem,  actors,  a  territory.  Agreements  are  concluded 
between forest owners (or their representative organizations) and economic operators, public 
institutions, associations of forest’ users or environmental protection, local authorities or the 
                                                
22 The major objective of Natura 2000 is to maintain species and habitats of Community interest in a good state 
of preservation. 
23 Nans-sous-Sainte-Anne is a small rural district (Department of the Doubs, region of Franche-Comté) whose 
main income comes from forestry activities and to a lesser extent, tourism benefits associated with its natural and 
scenic landscape (150 000 visitors per year). 
24 This method allows to extract woods by an aerial mode and thus, not to drag woods on the ground. 
25 Art. L 12. Loi N° 2001-602 du 9 juillet 2001 d’orientation sur la forêt. Through action programs, the aim of 
these charters is: to guarantee the satisfaction of specific environmental or social demands on the management of 
forests and natural areas that are connected; or to encourage the technical and economic grouping of forest 
owners; or to enhance the competitiveness of the production sector, the promotion of forest products.   10 
State.  Public aid may  be  done  in  return  for  economic, environmental and  social  services 
rendered by the forest when they induce specific constraints or additional costs of investment 
and management. Regarding biodiversity, the most frequent actions relate to the knowledge of 
habitats, the preservation of sensitive areas (wetlands, Natura 2000 sites), the promotion of 
silvicultural practices promoting ordinary biodiversity (such as irregular forest
26 or practices 
respectful of soil and water resources), the borders’ management, the support or the creation 
of  ecological  corridors.  For  example,  the  charter  of  the  Morvan  Forest  (2004-2006)  has 
allowed the design and the installation of 10 reference plots and the natural regeneration of 
Douglas fir. 
 
Finally,  the  contractual  approach  has  several  advantages.  It  allows:  to  adapt  easily  to 
differentiated  territorial  approaches  depending  on  the  issues  and  the  structure  of  land 
ownership; to involve the owners and managers in place, respecting their prerogatives and 
most  of  their  choices  and  limiting  financial  support  to  the  marginal  cost  induced  by  the 
targeted action, without transferring to government (or any set of actors with a project on a 
territory) all operating expenses; to integrate the multifunctional aspect of the forest (i.e. its 
ecological, social and economic functions). 
In  areas  of  high  importance  in  terms  of  biodiversity,  it  is  essential  to identify  how  their 
management can meet the needs previously specified. The solution of contracting on the basis 
of clearly stated objectives,  identifying  performance indicators (and compensation  for the 
forest owner) seems to be favour for an environmentally effective and economically efficient 
conservation. The contracting will solve complex and territorialised problems that traditional 
tools of forest policy do not know treat well. However, the objective is not to replace those 
tools but to supplement them. Indeed, the State is entitled to impose constraints for the public 
interest but in order to maximize the effectiveness of its intervention these constraints must 
raise a  minimum  support  among  the  concerned  forest  owners.  A  social  contract  between 
government and the owners would allow the latter to feel valued and recognized in their 
dimension of heritage manager, feelings involved in the acceptability of the mechanism. 
 
3.  Procurement auction for conservation contracts 
The problem of contractual relationships is that they are subject to informational asymmetries 
that can limit the efficiency of PES. Indeed, the sellers (i.e. private landowners who provide 
ES) have private information (including opportunity costs) they can use as market power to 
obtain  informational  rent.  Due  to  budgetary  constraints,  the  buyers’  objective  (public 
authorities,  conservation  agencies)  is  to  limit  this  informational  rent  to  maximize  the  ES 
obtained from a limited budget. The procurement auction use the auction rules to limit the 
sellers’ incentives to inflate their price contract: because of competition for a contract, sellers 
are  less  inclined  to  propose  a  strategic  bid,  i.e.  a  bid  higher  than  their  opportunity  cost, 
because it would reduce the probability of selection of their bid.  
“An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource 
allocation and prices on the basis of bids from market participants” (McAfee and 
McMillan, 1987). 
                                                
26 Continuous cover forestry with species mixtures and different class-aged.   11 
A procurement auction for conservation contracts
27 is defined as “a process through 
which  a  buyer  of  environmental  services  invites  bids  (tenders)  from  suppliers  of 
environmental services for a specified contract and then buys the contracts with the 
lowest bids” (Ferraro, 2008). 
The use of an auction mechanism requires a rigorous study of the economic environment in 
which it is applied. Every economic environment is unique in that it depends on the market 
structure, the nature of the good or service and the uncertainty about its value. In addition, the 
choice of an auction format rather than another must be closely linked to the objectives set by 
its  designer.  Moreover,  conservation  contracts  have  special  characteristics  (they  concern 
goods and services derived from biodiversity, i.e. a public good) and they do not meet all the 
standard assumptions of the auction theory
28. So, to make recommendations and to analyse 
the  performance  of  different  characteristics  for  the  auction,  one  must  turn  to  existing 
experiences, experiments and modelling rather than theory (Ferraro, 2008).  
In what follows, we present some experiences of auction for conservation contracts
29. Most of 
these experiences being recent, results are not yet established. 
 
- The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) – US 
The CRP is the greater public-private partnership for conservation and habitat protection in 
the United States (FSA-USDA, 1999; USDA, 2009). It is a voluntary land retirement program 
that offers monetary incentives to farmers and landowners to withdraw highly erodible land 
and sensitive crop-lands to the production channels. Bids (made by landowners) are assigned 
an  Environmental  Benefits  Index  (EBI)  that  allows  them  to  be  evaluated  in  terms  of 
environmental indicators
30 and their cost (i.e. the price required by the owner). This program 
allowed  various  environmental  benefits  such  as  reduction  of  nitrogen,  soil  erosion  and 
phosphorous, and sequestration of carbon dioxide (Ferris and Siikamäki, 2009). Otherwise, 
habitat improvement has allowed the number of Colchis pheasant (Phasianus colchicus) to 
increase in nine states (Nielson et al., 2006). Currently, the CRP is the federal program that 
contributes the most to the carbon sequestration benefits (FSA, 2007). 
 
- The BushTender and EcoTender programs – Australia  
The  BushTender
31  program  is  a  pilot  program  (launched  in  2001)  which  seeks  the 
participation of private landowners to control salinity, nutrients and biodiversity conservation. 
Tenders are assessed via a Biodiversity Benefits Index (BBI) that incorporates three factors: 
the importance of the site in terms of biodiversity (via a Biodiversity Significance Score), the 
habitat improvement associated with the owner’s actions (via a Habitat Services Score) and 
the supply cost (i.e. the amount requested by the owner to protect and improve the vegetation 
on his land).  Bids are  ranked  from the highest BBI  to the lowest  one,  and contracts are 
allocated until the funds run out. This program allowed many actions to be undertaken such as 
retention of large trees or fallen timber, control of rabbits and weeds, supplementary planting 
and revegetation (Stoneham et al., 2003; Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005).  
                                                
27 We call “conservation contract” a contract that, for certain activities or management, preserve or enhance 
biodiversity or ecological services. 
28 For details on auction theory, see Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981). 
29 See Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005), Brahic (2010b). 
30 These indicators include objectives in terms of wildlife, water quality, erosion, air quality… 
31 See Stoneham et al. (2003), DSE (2008).   12 
Encouraged by the success of the BushTender program, the Australian government has funded 
other  pilot  projects  (RiverTender,  HabitatTender  and  EcoTender).  Launched  in  2005, 
EcoTender
32  project  covers  multiple  environmental  objectives
33:  it  encourages  private 
landowners to manage their land and water resources in order to improve control salinity, 
biodiversity and water quality of watersheds, and to sequester carbon. This project includes a 
complex measure of environmental performance (due to multiple environmental objectives, 
the  metric  uses  the  Catchment  Modelling  Framework
34).  The  bids  selection  for  multiple 
environmental outcomes is the first of its kind; it is therefore a learning exercise. 
 
- The Auction for Landscape Recovery (ALR) – Australia 
The ALR program concerns highly biodiverse landscapes in area threatened by salinity and 
clearing effects for agriculture. The objective is to achieve environmental outcomes for native 
biodiversity, water and soil management. Bids are evaluated with two methods: via the EBI  
(used  in  BushTender  and  CRP  programs)  and  via  the  Systematic  Conservation  Planning 
approach  (SCP)
35  which  uses  a  complementarity  biodiversity  metric  (Faith  and  Walker, 
1996)
36. The difference between these two methods is that the bid evaluation through EBI is 
independent of the other bids, while the evaluation via SCP depends on all other selected 
bids
37. The management actions implemented include: fence of remnant and vegetation, wild 
animal  control  (rabbit,  fox),  corridors  construction,  weeds  control,  revegetation  and 
implementation  of  commitments  to  nature  conservation  and  voluntary  management 
agreements (see Gole et al., 2005).  
 
- The Catchment Care program – Australia  
This auction has been set up in 2004 to encourage management actions for restoring natural 
resources of the riparian areas and protecting the watershed of Onkaparinga (South Australia). 
The  sites  proposed  by  the  owners  are  assigned  an  environmental  value  derived  from 
geomorphological and hydrological characteristics and remnant vegetation. This program is 
based on a risk analysis: the proposed actions are evaluated in terms of risk reduction they can 
afford. So, the environmental benefit is considered in terms of risk of the site, the total threat 
reduction achieved by the owners’ actions, and the area affected by these actions
38. To ensure 
an efficient allocation, bids with the most important environmental benefits per dollar are 
selected and funded. This program has funded various activities, including weeds eradication, 




                                                
32 See Eigenraam et al. (2006). 
33 EcoTender is also named Multiple-Outcome Auction of Land-Use Change. 
34 See Eigenraam et al. (2006). 
35 See Margules and Pressey (2000), Sarkar et al. (2002). 
36 This approach takes into account synergistic aspects due to the number, the size and the distance from several 
areas. See Vane-Wright et al. (1991), Pressey et al. (1993), Sarkar (2004). 
37 Results are comparable from one method to another (cumulated value of selected bids, cost). However, as part 
of a wider application, it is expected that the SCP approach outperforms the EBI approach due to the integration 
of the complementarity concept, which can take into account priorities changes when areas contributing to the 
conservation management are added. So, most comprehensive analysis of these data would be needed.  
38 Details in Bryan et al. (2005a, 2005b).   13 
- The Northeim-project – Germany 
The  objective of this  project is to reward,  through a bidding process, the  owners for the 
provision  of  environmental  services  such  as  withdrawal  of  intensive  cultivation  and 
substitution with meadows of high ecological quality and floristic biodiversity. The program 
particularity is that the payment is contingent on results (and not on the actions, like the others 
programs)  which  are  measured  through  the  grassland  quality  obtained.  This  quality  is 
classified into three classes
39 defined by the number of different species per control plot. The 
results are assessed via controls at the end of the contract period. In 2006, 89 sites of class I 
(130.05 ha), 52 sites of class II (76.80 ha) and 23 sites of class III (31.61 ha) were involved in 
this program (Groth, 2008, 2009).  
 
The success of these experiences shows that, in practice, auctions are an interesting allocation 
mechanism for biodiversity conservation contracts. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This analysis of the international literature has shown that different instruments lead through 
regulation enforcement or through voluntarism to sustainably use or preserve biodiversity and 
associated services. It also allowed us to see in what context the various instruments are 
currently applied (the results are summarized in the Table 2 that identifies for each good or 
service derived from biodiversity a set of tools used to preserve them).  
The choice of a particular measure will depend on the element of biodiversity one need to 
preserve (genes, species, ecosystems, or environmental services provided by biodiversity) or 
the sectors of activities that exercise pressure on biological resources. The feasibility of the 
measures  depends  on  the  ecosystem,  the  economic  sector  or  the  social  group  which  is 
targeted.  However,  it  is  often  necessary  to  use  a  set  of  coupled  measures  (market-based 
instruments and regulations). 
Regulatory measures are generally used to protect endangered species or natural areas rich in 
species, by prohibiting their use or by setting restrictions on access. They have the advantage 
of being the most direct way to achieve a short-term environmental objective, but they are 
expensive and sometimes economically inefficient. So, market-based instruments offer new 
perspectives to achieve the biodiversity objectives at a lower cost. Particularly, the contractual 
approach presents some advantages  and seems to  be favour for biodiversity preservation. 
Moreover, procurement auctions for conservation contracts are more economically efficient 
than direct agreements between the conservation agency and a landowner potentially provider 
of an environmental service: through competition between owners, auction allows limiting 
informational rents and thereby increases the efficiency of the PES scheme. So, in the context 
of budgetary constraints, research should focus on procurement auctions. But what auction 
design should be used? Given the specific characteristics of goods and services concerned 
(public goods), the theory is not sufficient and it is necessary to rely on existing experiences. 
So, the analysis of different auction experiences allowed us to establish a general structure of 
auction that could encourage the French private forest owners to preserve biodiversity and the 
ES associated (Table 3). 
                                                
39 Class I: species number ³ 8 per control plot; Class II: species number ³ 8 per control plot plus 2 target species; 
Class III: species number ³ 8 per control plot plus 4 target species.   14 
 
Table 2: Mechanisms used to preserve biodiversity 
  Goods and services derived from 
biodiversity
40 
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Existence of species and ecosystem 
 
Regulation (protected areas) 
Subsidies (habitat / ecosystem)  
Tax benefits (habitat / fauna / flora)  
Payment for Environmental Services: conservation 
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acquisition, management contract, biodiversity offsets 
Flood control, Erosion control  Protection of ecosystem (via regulation, subsidies, tax 




Watershed management contracts  
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Credits (water quality, salinity)  
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40 This list of goods and services comes from OECD (2003).    15 
Table 3: Auction for conservation contracts in French private forests - Recommendations 
  Recommendations 
Auction features   Sealed-bid 
Discriminative pricing 
To capture synergies : joined bids, agglomeration bonus 
Budgetary constraint   Yes (generally, it is the case) 
Reserve price  Not necessary if budgetary constraint 
Payments   Conditional on activities and/or outcomes, depending on the objectives and the possibilities to measure results: 
-  On activities that promote expected environmental results 
-  On outcomes if they are observable 
-  Progressive payments 
Sites control (realised by experts) and annual reports (made by landowners on actions taken and results achieved) allow 
sanctions in case of non-compliance (e.g. by stopping payments). 
Bid selection method  Bids valuation is based on their quality and their price, the selected bids are the most cost-effective 
-  Valuation of activities through the calculation of an index 
￿ EBI approach: index that includes the environmental value of the site, the benefits of proposed actions (in terms of 
environmental objectives), the weighting system related to the conservation agency priorities and the price of the bid. 
￿ Complementarity approach: use software that calculates and identifies the optimal network of conservation areas. 
-  Valuation of outcomes through the determination of quality classes of results (species number, reforested areas…) 
Others  
-  Revealed information 
 
-  Contract duration 
 
The environmental objectives, but not their relative weights defined by the conservation agency priorities.  
 
Defined on a case by case, depending on the objectives and the time required to achieve them (5, 10, 30 years...). 
   16 
Some details about the auctions’ characteristics 
￿ It is preferable to use a sealed-bids auction to preserve competition and so, to limit the 
possibility  of  collusion  between  the  owners,  which  favours  strategic  behaviours
41  and 
informational rents.
42 
￿ The use of discriminatory price and not uniform price is advocated by works that have 
studied the impact of these two formats: 
-  Stoneham  et  al.  (2003)  assessed  the  efficiency  gain  of  the  BushTender  program 
compared to a uniform price. Their results showed that: i) a uniform price would need 
to  spend  seven  times  more  to  achieve  the  same  environmental  benefits  as  those 
currently obtained with BushTender; ii) for the same amount of funding, a uniform 
price system would generate 25% less benefits in terms of biodiversity.  
-  Regarding Auction for Landscape Recovery, the efficiency gain varies between 207% 
and  315%  for  the  first  session  and  between  165%  and  186%  for  the  second  one 
depending on whether the uniform price payments are based on inputs and outputs 
respectively (White and Burton, 2005).  
-  The Catchment Care program has been compared to an existing uniform price system, 
the Watercourse Management Assistance Program (WMAP). The results show that 
the auction is between 24% and 33% more efficient than the WMAP (Bryan et al., 
2005).  
-  Finally, Groth (2008) evaluates the efficiency gain of the Northeim-project from a 
uniform price between 21% and 36%.  
However, in an auction that allows owners to revise their bid, Cummings et al. (2004) found 
that initially, prices are lower in average in the discriminatory price auction, but the difference 
disappears gradually as the suppliers revise their proposal (due to a learning process). So, 
results are sensitive to the tender’ rules, the characteristics of contracts and bidders.  
￿ The presence of synergies in the adjacent conservation areas is a possibility that should be 
addressed because it can increase the effectiveness of conservation efforts. For capture them, 
it is necessary to allow joined bids and to provide agglomeration bonus (Parkhurst et al., 
2002),  i.e.  consortia  of  owners  and  higher  payments  when  multiple  owners  coordinate. 
Current policies do not take into account the synergies; they focus on contracts between the 
public agency and the owners individually. So, in the future, it will be useful to consider 
whether  such  synergies  are  possible  and  if  so,  to  evaluate  the  bids  through  the 
complementarity principle. 
￿ Except some specific cases, the relationship between a set of biodiversity conservation 
activities and the results obtained at a given time is subject to various uncontrolled factors 
such as climate  changes,  droughts, floods,  epidemics,  invasive species,  or  the  impacts  of 
activities in upstream areas. Furthermore, it is not always easy (as it is often the case) to 
measure environmental outcomes
43. For these reasons, payments are generally contingent on 
activities  undertaken  by  the  owners  and  not  contingent  on  the  environmental  results. 
Nevertheless, the conservation agency retains some control over the outcome through the 
                                                
41 The suppliers may agree to bid higher. 
42 The open-bid auctions, repeated, with uniform price, are generally more likely to generate collusion than 
sealed-bid auctions (Klemperer, 2002). 
43 For example, if the environmental objective is to increase the population of an endangered species, one cannot 
necessarily estimate accurately the individual’s number of this species.   17 
specification of specific management activities that are supposed to provide in a large extent 
the environmental outcomes. Thus, some programs rely on progressive payments
44; and sites 
controls (realised by experts) and annual reports (made by the owners) are required to verify 
that the terms of the contract are being met and to sanction owner in case of non-compliance 
with these terms by stopping payments. 
￿ The owners differ in their opportunity cost but also in the quality of the ES they offer. So, 
bids should be ranked and selected on the basis of their price and their quality (we talk about 
“Score auction”). Theoretically, these auctions are more efficient than those that ignore the 
heterogeneity  in  terms  of  quality  (Che,  1993;  Latacz-Lohmann  and  Van  der  Hamsvoort, 
1997). Two possibilities exist: 
-  To assign an environmental benefits value for each proposed contract, but given the 
difficulties to give a monetary value on the ES, one prefer to use a scoring rule, with 
the construction of an index such as the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) used in 
most of the programs listed above. 
-  To use the complementarity biodiversity metric (SCP approach) where a bid valuation 
depends  on  all  the  other  selected  bids.  This  method  should  outperform  the  EBI 
method. 
￿  The  conservation  agency  must  decide  what  information  it  will  reveal  to  the  owners, 
including that relating to the valuation rules. This choice is not straightforward and depends 
on the objectives: firstly, the announcement of these rules may encourage owners to reveal 
information relating to the quality of proposed activities that would be difficult or expensive 
to obtain for the conservation agency; but on the other hand, quality differentiation can be 
another source of rent for the owners (e.g., if a landowner knows that he is alone to host an 
endangered species,  he is  encouraged to propose a  bid higher than his  opportunity cost), 
which increases conservation spending and reduces the auction effectiveness (Cason et al., 
2003). A reasonable compromise is to reveal only a part of the information: revealing the 
quality criteria (relevant to the conservation agency) can attract the 'good' owners and guide 
them in formulating their  bids, which correspond  to the agency’  preferences; and do not 
revealing their relative weights (accorded by the conservation agency) will prevent owners to 
make  strategic  bids  (i.e.  bids  above  their  opportunity  cost).  This  partial  revelation  of 
information compels owners to offer a price very close to the opportunity cost of the proposed 
measures. By creating this informational asymmetry (in favour of the conservation agency) 
and requiring owners to submit their bids individually, the government can maintain the total 
cost to a level lower than that would get with other systems. 
￿ Finally, wherever possible, a multiple-outcome approach
45 is advocated because it reduces 
transaction  costs:  establishing  a  single  large  program  that  includes  several  environmental 
objectives rather than several programs which target one objective saves time and money (it is 
more profitable to visit each site once for multiple goods rather than to visit them each time 




                                                
44 Generally three payments: one at the beginning of the contract, one at the mid-term and one at the end of the 
contract. 
45 Via the Catchment Modelling Framework.   18 
Which perspectives for the French private forests? 
Since  conservation  contracts  and  auction  participation  are  based  on  voluntarism,  social 
acceptability  is  of  great  importance.  Horne  (2006,  2009)  examines  factors  affecting  the 
acceptance of biodiversity conservation contracts to forest owners in Finland and the amount 
of compensation required
46. This study uses the Choice Experiment method (Adamowicz et 
al., 1998; Louviere et al., 2000) to analyse data collected from 3 000 landowners
47. It is the 
first application of this method to evaluate the terms of a contract for environmental policy. 
This study improves contracts structure in order to maximize participation.  
So, our objective is to apply  this method to the French private forest sector.  This socio-
economic study should allow: 
-  To identify characteristics of conservation contracts and of auction system that are 
potentially acceptable by the owners; 
-  To identify the owners’ characteristics supporting the acceptability of conservation 
contracts and auctions, to target potential participants (a broad participation being a 
guarantee of an efficient environmental outcome); 
-  To identify environmental issues (preservation of habitat, fauna, flora, provision of 
environmental services ...) which are best suited to a contractual approach according to 
the surveyed landowners (in prospect to a broad participation). 
This socioeconomic study is an essential step before the development and implementation of a 
pilot program based on an auction for conservation contracts. Lessons learned from this first 




                                                
46 The average annual demand for compensation is around 224 €. 
47 Data were collected by a postal survey (summer 2003).   19 
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